I. Introduction
Is there (still) a norm that husbands should earn more than their wives? In the U.S. marriage market, wives are more likely to earn just less than their husbands than just more, and some economists have argued that this pattern reflects an aversion to primary-earner wives (Bertrand, Kamenica, & Pan, 2015) . Others have cautioned against inferring social preferences from observed marital sorting, arguing that the scarcity of primary-earner wives is consistent with a wide range of preferences regarding the relative earnings of spouses (Binder & Lam, 2018) . This paper proposes an alternative source of evidence on these preferences: measurement error in the earnings reporting for husbands and wives in a large, nationally representative survey.
The desire to present oneself in a positive light can lead survey respondents to over-report socially favored behaviors and under-report disfavored ones (Bound, Brown, & Mathiowetz, 2000) . Measurement error resulting from social desirability concerns is usually viewed as a problem to be overcome. For researchers interested in the true answer to a survey question, estimates are biased by systematic deviations of responses from the truth. For researchers interested in social preferences, however, these same deviations may contain useful information. We suggest that, if there is a norm that husbands should out-earn their wives, survey respondents will tend to under-report the relative earnings of wives who out-earn their husbands.
Whether and when survey-reported earnings are biased by identity-related concerns is an open question. A growing body of research shows that the difference between survey responses and administrative records varies with socioeconomic characteristics, including income, education, race, and gender (Bollinger, Hirsch, Hokayem, & Ziliak, Forthcoming; Bound & Krueger, 1991; Gideon, Heggeness, Murray-Close, & Myers, 2017; Kim & Tamborini, 2012; Kim & Tamborini, 2014;  3 Meyer & Mittag, 2019; Roth & Slotwinski, 2018) . In addition, wages reported by proxy respondents tend to be lower than self-reported wages. As a result, estimates of the gender wage gap are higher when more women rely on proxy respondents and lower when more men do (Lee & Lee, 2012; Reynolds & Wenger, 2012) . On the other hand, one study found that the downward bias in proxy-reported earnings is concentrated among single women; proxy-reported earnings for single men and married couples appear relatively accurate (Tamborini & Kim, 2013) . More broadly, a review of research on survey measurement error concluded that, while social-desirability bias is a concern with survey data generally, there is little evidence of it in survey-reported earnings in particular (Bound, Brown, & Mathiowetz, 2000) .
We consider a narrow identity-related concern: whether a husband should be the primary earner in his marriage. Previous research on measurement error in survey-reported earnings has focused on broad identity categories like race and gender (Gideon, Heggeness, Murray-Close, & Myers, 2017; Tamborini & Kim, 2013; Lee & Lee, 2012; Reynolds & Wenger, 2012) . Because membership in these categories is correlated with myriad other characteristics that may affect earnings reporting, including unobservable characteristics, it is hard to know whether the observed differences in measurement error across categories stem from groupspecific social desirability concerns. In contrast, a discontinuous change in measurement error at the point where a wife's earnings surpass her husband's seems less likely to stem from confounding differences between couples. Building on existing work showing evidence that is consistent with the presence of a malebreadwinner norm (Bertrand, Kamenica, & Pan, 2015) , we directly test this hypothesis using two different sources of income data.
We use a regression-discontinuity analysis to compare the earnings reporting of couples where the wife earns just more than her husband with that of couples where she earns just less. We measure deviations of survey-reported earnings from 4 true earnings by comparing the earnings reported for husbands and wives in the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC) with those reported by their employers in their W-2 tax filings. We find that survey respondents are 15.9 percentage points more likely to under-report the wife's share of a couple's earnings when her true share is just over half than when it is just under half. This under-reporting of the wife's earnings share reflects adjustments in earnings reporting for both husbands and wives: when a wife earns more than her husband, survey respondents are 5.1 percentage points less likely to over-report her earnings and 5.8 percentage points more likely to over-report his. We infer from these results that it is still socially preferable for a husband to earn more than his wife.
II. Data: Matched Survey and Income-Tax Records
This paper asks whether survey respondents deflate the earnings of primaryearner wives or inflate the earnings secondary-earner husbands, relative to their true earnings. To answer this question, we need matched data on husbands' and wives' survey-reported and true earnings. We obtain data on survey-reported earnings from Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplements (CPS ASEC) from 2003 to 2013. The CPS ASEC is a household-based survey providing nationally representative data on the income, employment, and demographic characteristics of the non-institutionalized civilian population in the U.S. The survey identifies relationships between household members, including husbands and wives, allowing us to construct a nationally representative sample of married couples.
Interviewers administer the CPS ASEC questionnaire to adult members of sampled households, either in person or by telephone. In most cases, a single household respondent completes the questionnaire for all household members. The 5 respondent for a married couple in the CPS ASEC may be the husband, the wife, or another adult household member. To distinguish between the husbands and wives whose earnings we study and the respondents who provide information about them, we refer to the former as "survey subjects" and the latter as "survey respondents."
We obtain data on husbands' and wives' "true" earnings from the Social Security Administration's Detailed Earnings Records (DER). The DER contains administrative records of individual income reported by employers to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Specifically, for each tax year from 1978 onward, it contains workers' earnings from all jobs with W-2 filings, as well as selfemployment income covered by either the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) or the Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA).
We match the survey records of CPS ASEC survey subjects to their DER earnings records using a unique individual identifier called a Protected Identification Key (PIK). Using probabilistic matching on identifiers like name, date of birth, and street address, the Census Bureau assigns PIKs to records in both survey and administrative datasets (Layne, Wagner, & Rothhaas, 2014) .
Specifically, the bureau attempts to match each person in a survey or administrative dataset to a person in an internal reference file that contains the PIKs. An evaluation of the bureau's matching process found that it typically assigns PIKs to between 90 and 93 percent of survey records and 98 percent of administrative records (Mulrow, Mushtaq, Pramanik, & Fontes, 2011) . We match each survey record with a PIK in our CPS ASEC sample of husbands and wives to any DER records that share the same PIK.
We construct our survey-and administrative-earnings measures to maximize their comparability. For a given survey subject in a given year, our survey-earnings measure is the total wage and salary income that the household respondent reported that the survey subject earned during that year. Our administrative-earnings 6 measure for the same survey subject in the same year is his or her total wage and salary income (the sum of wages, tips, and deferred compensation) from all jobs with W-2 filings. 1 We convert all dollar amounts to 2010 dollars with the Consumer Price Index research series using current methods (CPI-U-RS).
We treat our administrative-earnings measure as a measure of husbands' and wives' true earnings, even though tax records are not perfectly accurate and survey records may be more accurate than tax records in some cases. The key assumption behind this approach is that measurement error in husbands' and wives' tax records is unrelated to their social preferences regarding primary-earner wives. Given that employers submit W-2 forms for their employees directly to the IRS, it would be difficult for workers to distort the earnings recorded for them in the administrative data. In contrast, CPS ASEC respondents may feel some pressure to give socially desirable answers when interacting with an interviewer and could easily distort the earnings recorded for workers in the survey data.
We construct our analytic sample from the pooled 2003-13 CPS ASEC samples. The sample includes observations of different-sex married couples whose marriages meet the following criteria in the calendar year before their interview:
First, both spouses are between 25 and 54 years old. Second, both spouses are employed. Third, because our earnings measures exclude self-employment income, both spouses have their primary job (the job they held longest during the survey reference year) with a private-sector or government employer. This last requirement excludes couples where one or both spouses are primarily self-employed. We refer to the observations that meet these substantive sample-selection criteria as the We derive the analytic sample from the baseline sample by excluding observations with imputed or inconsistent earnings data. To start, we exclude observations where a working spouse has imputed survey earnings (28.6 percent of the baseline sample). 3 Next, we exclude observations where a spouse lacks the unique identifier used to link survey records to administrative records (the PIK) (8.3 percent). We also exclude observations of couples where a spouse has a unique identifier but lacks a linked tax record, because we cannot determine the true earnings of these spouses (4.6 percent). Finally, to focus on earnings misreporting that might plausibly be attributed to social-desirability concerns, we exclude observations where a spouse has a gap of more than 100 percent between his or her survey earnings and his or her tax earnings (4.9 percent). After applying these additional sample-selection criteria, the analytic sample includes 53.5 percent of the observations in the baseline sample, with approximately 96,000 observations of approximately 74,000 couples.
With the CPS ASEC person-level sampling weights, which are identical for husbands and wives and can thus be applied to couples, the baseline sample is approximately representative of dual-earner married couples in the U.S. between 2003 and 2013 with both spouses between 25 and 54 years old and not primarily self-employed in the previous calendar year. Our analytic sample, however, excludes 46.5 percent of the observations in the baseline sample. To improve the 2 The CPS ASEC is a short-panel survey, and some couples appear in the data twice. Throughout the paper, reported sample sizes are rounded according to the Census Bureau's disclosure-avoidance requirements. 3 The Census Bureau imputes missing earnings in the CPS-ASEC using a hot-deck procedure that assigns each person without reported earnings the earnings of a donor with similar characteristics. Including observations with hot-decked earnings in wage regressions has been shown to cause match bias, a form of attenuation bias, in the coefficients on variables not used to select donors (Bollinger & Hirsch, 2006; Hirsch & Schumacher, 2004) . Since the earnings of a person's spouse relative to the person's own earnings are not used to select donors in the Census Bureau's hot-deck procedure, including observations with imputed earnings in our analysis sample would increase the probability that we fail to detect an effect of higher-earning wives on earnings reporting, should such an effect exist.
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representativeness of our estimates, we adjust the CPS ASEC sampling weights for the probability that an observation is in the analytic sample, conditional on being in the baseline sample. Specifically, we estimate a logit model predicting the probability that an observation in the baseline sample is also in the analytic sample. 4 We multiply the CPS ASEC sampling weight for each couple by the inverse of their predicted probability of being in the analytic sample.
III. Empirical Approach: Survey Measurement Error as Evidence of Social Norms
We divide the couples in our analytic sample into two groups based on their administrative earnings: "traditional" couples, where the wife earns no more than the husband, and "non-traditional" couples, where the wife earns strictly more than the husband. Our empirical strategy is to compare the error in survey-reported earnings relative to tax records for traditional versus non-traditional couples. We hypothesize the existence of a norm that husbands should earn more than their wives and conceptualize social discomfort with violating this norm as a treatment experienced by non-traditional couples. Consistent with widespread evidence that 4 The predictor variables are demographic characteristics (age, race, citizenship status, and educational attainment) of the husband and the wife, whether each spouse worked in the last calendar year, the couple's region of residence, whether the couple lived in a metropolitan area, and the year of the couple's CPS-ASEC interview. 5 It is not obvious whether couples with equal earnings are norm-conforming or norm-violating-that is, it is not obvious whether the norm in question is "a husband should earn more than his wife" or "a wife should not earn more than her husband." In our data, equal-earning couples are less likely to under-report the wife's earnings share than traditional couples, who (as we will see) are less likely to under-report it than non-traditional couples. Since equal-earning couples behave more like traditional than non-traditional couples, we group them with traditional ones in our analysis. This distinction is not empirically important: classifying the fewer than 150 equal-earning couples in the administrative data as non-traditional does not alter our results. For ease of exposition, we refer throughout the paper to a "husband-earns-more" norm rather than a "wife-does-not-earn-more" norm.
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survey respondents under-report behaviors perceived as socially undesirable, we ask whether non-traditional couples are more likely than traditional couples to under-report the wife's earnings share. We interpret evidence of differential underreporting as evidence of a treatment effect and thus of an active husband-earnsmore norm.
Our main analysis uses a regression-discontinuity approach to compare the earnings reporting of couples just below and just above the equal-earnings threshold. In the presence of a husband-earns-more norm, the treatment-the social discomfort from a primary-earner wife-switches on when a couple crosses the threshold. We thus expect couples where the wife earns slightly more than her husband to behave differently than couples where the wife earns slightly less. In subsequent analyses, we compare the earnings reporting of traditional and nontraditional couples more broadly.
IV. Main Results: Couples with Primary-Earner Wives Are More Likely to Under-Report the Wife's Earnings Share Descriptive Results
Before turning to regression analysis, we visually examine the relationship between the wife's earnings share in the administrative data and the couple's tendency to under-report the wife's earnings share in the survey. We define the wife's earnings share as the proportion of a couple's total earnings attributable to the wife:
The subscript indexes couples. The superscript distinguishes survey earnings measures ( = ) from administrative earnings measures ( = ). The variables 10 and are the wife's earnings and the husband's earnings, respectively. We consider the wife's earnings share to be under-reported if it is lower in the survey data than the administrative data:
We divide the couples in our analytic sample into 50 bins of width 0.02 based on their values of ℎ . Figure 1 shows the proportion of couples in each bin that under-report the wife's earnings share in the survey data relative to the administrative data. 6 The figure shows a clear jump in the probability of underreporting at ℎ = 0.5. Couples just to the right of the equal-earnings threshold are about 16 percentage points more likely to under-report the wife's earnings share than couples just to the left.
Regression Results
We estimate the impact of crossing the equal-earnings threshold on the earnings reporting of couples near the threshold using RD regressions of the form Figure A1 assesses the possibility that the jump in under-reporting at the equal-earnings threshold in Figure 1 corresponds to a jump in some other characteristic of couples at the threshold. The figure shows the mean value in each bin of each of several characteristics that may be correlated with the wife's earnings share and with the measurement error in the couple's earnings reports: the husband and wife's earnings, age, and indicators for having a college degree. None of these characteristics appear to change discontinuously at the equal-earnings threshold.
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, chosen to capture the underlying relationship between the outcome and ℎ (Lee & Lemieux, 2010; Jacob, Zhu, Somers, & Bloom, 2012) .
is a vector of couple characteristics. For both the husband and the wife, contains age in five-year bins, race (white, black, Hispanic, Asian, or another race), educational attainment (less than high school, high school degree, some college, college degree, or more than college), and a cubic polynomial in the natural log of administrative earnings. For the couple, contains the members' standard census geography region (Northeast, Midwest, South, or West), residence (i.e., whether they live in a metropolitan area), the natural log of their total administrative earnings, the identity of the couple's CPS ASEC household respondent (husband, wife, or someone else), and the year of its CPS ASEC interview.
We estimate equation (2) on the sample of dual-earner couples where each spouse earns at least 10 percent of the couple's earnings in the administrative data.
We prefer this trimmed sample to the full dual-earner sample for two reasons. First, the data are relatively sparse at the upper end of the ℎ range. Second, excluding couples with values of ℎ that are far from the equalearnings threshold makes it less likely that a misspecification of the underlying relationship between ℎ and would bias our estimate of the treatment effect near the threshold. 7 Because some couples in the sample are observed twice, we cluster the standard errors by couple.
The coefficient of primary interest is , which gives the effect of crossing the equal-earnings threshold on the probability that the wife's earnings share is underreported. The estimate of is not sensitive to our choice of (•) (see columns 1-4
of Table 1 ) and does not change appreciably when we add the control variables in (columns 5-6). Our preferred specification includes the control variables, a 7 An alternative approach would be to estimate a local linear regression. Given that the estimate of from equation (2) is not sensitive to our choice of functional form (Table 1) , we are comfortable proceeding with parametric estimation.
12 quadratic function of the wife's earnings share, and an interaction of this function with the non-traditional indicator (column 6). 8 The estimate of from this specification suggests that compared with couples just below the equal-earnings threshold, couples just above the threshold are 15.9 percentage points more likely to under-report the wife's earnings share.
V. Additional Results: The Earnings Reporting of Wives versus Husbands Whose Earnings Are Misreported?
We have seen that CPS ASEC survey respondents are more likely to underreport the wife's share of a couple's earnings when the wife out-earns her husband.
Since the wife's earnings share is a function of just two variables, the husband's earnings and those of the wife, this result suggests that one or both of the following is true: (1) respondents are less likely to over-report the earnings of non-traditional wives than those of traditional wives, and/or (2) respondents are more likely to over-report the earnings of non-traditional husbands than those of traditional husbands.
9 Figure 2 shows the individual-level earnings reporting of the husbands and wives whose joint behavior gives rise to couple-level reporting shown in Figure 1 .
Specifically, Figure 2 shows the proportion of wives and the proportion of husbands 8 To find the simplest specification that captures the relationship between the wife's earnings share and the probability of under-reporting apart from the jump at the equal-earnings threshold, columns 1-4 of Table 1 augment equation (2) with a set of indicators for 0.02-width bins of the wife's earnings share. These bin indicators provide a flexible representation of the underlying relationship, as shown in Figure 1 . When we cannot reject that the coefficients on the bin indicators are jointly equal to zero in a given specification, as occurs with the quadratic specification in column 4 of Table 1 , we conclude that the specification (minus the bin indicators) adequately captures the relationship (Lee & Lemieux, 2010; Jacob, Zhu, Somers, & Bloom, 2012) . 9 More precisely, it must be true that the probability of < is greater for non-traditional couples than traditional couples. It is thus technically possible that the earnings of non-traditional wives (husbands) are more (less) likely to be over-reported in absolute terms but less (more) likely to be over-reported in relative terms. This scenario turns out to be empirically unsupported.
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in each ℎ bin whose earnings are over-reported in the survey data relative to the administrative data. Consistent with our finding that couples to the left of the equal-earnings threshold are more likely than couples to the right to under-report the wife's earnings share, we observe a rise around the threshold in the probability that the husband's earnings are over-reported and a corresponding fall in the probability that the wife's earnings are over-reported. Away from the threshold, among couples in the trimmed analytic sample (the sample with 0.1 ≤ ℎ ≤ 0.9), the probability of over-reporting is relatively flat.
The patterns in Figure 2 suggest that earnings reports for both husbands and wives contribute to the under-reporting of non-traditional wives' earnings relative to their husbands' earnings. However, couples on opposite sides of the equalearnings threshold differ along several dimensions that may influence measurement error in survey-earnings reporting, including the absolute income level of both husbands and wives ( Figure A1 ). 10 To compare the reporting behavior of traditional and non-traditional spouses, net of observable differences in demographic characteristics and income levels, we stratify the trimmed analytic sample by sex and estimate sex-specific regressions of the form
The subscript i indexes individual husbands or wives, and the other variables are as defined in equation (2). The vector in equation (3) 14 omit or control more flexibly for ℎ are available in Appendix Table   A1 .
We consider two related outcomes: first, whether the husband or wife's earnings are over-reported in the survey data relative to the administrative data; and second, the difference between the husband's or wife's survey and administrative earnings. In the first case, we estimate linear probability models where is an indicator for over-reporting. In the second, we estimate OLS models where is the natural log of the husband's or wife's survey earnings. Because includes the natural log of the person's administrative earnings, the estimates of from this second set of models can be interpreted as the effect of non-traditional status on the difference between the person's survey and administrative earnings, conditional on the other covariates. Table 2 are consistent with the idea that survey respondents misreport or minimize violations of a husband-earns-more norm.
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We are interested in the gap between survey and administrative earnings primarily as a measure of social norms rather than as a measure of data quality. For users of survey data, however, it should be reassuring that the effect of nontraditional status is small. A 1-percent increase in the survey earnings of a minority of husbands seems unlikely to cause large distortions in estimates of key population parameters like average earnings or the gender wage gap. The same is true of a 1-percent decrease in the survey earnings of their wives. Thus, it appears that measurement error in the CPS ASEC allows us to learn about gendered norms in marriage with minimal harm to other research using the same earnings data.
Does It Matter Who Answers the Survey?
As noted above, the earnings of each couple in the CPS ASEC survey are reported by a single household respondent. The household respondent is an individual 15 years of age or over who either owns or rents the housing unit. 11 The respondent may be the husband, the wife, or another adult who lives with them. The estimates presented up to this point controlled for the identity of the household respondent, but they assumed that husbands and wives react in the same way to non-traditional marital earnings. There are at least two reasons to think that this assumption might be wrong.
First, men may be more invested than women in traditional gender roles.
Pooled data from the 2002-2012 samples of the General Social Survey show that among men and women between the ages of 25 and 54 during the period covered by our study, 26 percent of women but just 15 percent of men strongly disagreed that "it is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family." average than self-reported wages and that the difference was larger for men than for women (Reynolds & Wenger, 2012; Lee & Lee, 2012) . These patterns suggest that the gendered effect of non-traditional status on earnings reporting may vary with the identity of the household survey respondent.
To determine whether husband survey respondents react differently than wife survey respondents when wives out-earn their husbands, we stratify the trimmed analytic sample by the identity of the earner and the identity of the survey respondent. We drop observations where the survey respondent is neither the husband nor the wife. We then estimate equation (3) for each of the following groups: wife earners described by wife survey respondents, wife earners described by husband survey respondents, husband earners described by wife survey respondents, and husband earners described by husband survey respondents. Table 3 shows the estimates of from these regressions. Both husband survey respondents and wife survey respondents appear to contribute to the pattern observed in the preceding analysis: both are more likely to over-report the earnings of non-traditional husbands than those of traditional husbands and less likely to over-report the earnings of non-traditional wives than those of traditional wives.
The estimates in Table 3 are not entirely consistent with the prediction that husband survey respondents react more strongly than wife survey respondents to violations of the husband-earns-more norm. As expected, the (negative) effect of non-traditional status on the probability of over-reporting the wife's earnings is stronger among husband survey respondents than wife survey respondents.
Contrary to our expectations, however, the (positive) effect of non-traditional status on the probability of over-reporting the husband's earnings is stronger among wife survey respondents than husband survey respondents. Furthermore, while the effect of non-traditional status on the difference between survey and administrative earnings is statistically significant when both husbands and wives report their spouse's earnings, it is not statistically significant when either husbands or wives report their own earnings.
We can only speculate about why non-traditional husband and wife survey respondents distort the earnings of their spouses more than their own earnings. One possible reason is that social norms interact with knowledge. When a wife out-earns her husband, both the husband and the wife may be uncomfortable-or believe that an interviewer will be uncomfortable-with their violation of the husband-earnsmore norm. Accordingly, they may be tempted to inflate their reports of the husband's earnings and deflate their reports of the wife's. At the same time, both the husband and the wife may wish to provide accurate responses to the survey. To the extent that the desire for norm conformity conflicts with the desire for accurate reporting, accurate reporting may win out more often when respondents are fairly certain of the answer to a survey question (as they are likely to be when reporting their own earnings) than when they are less certain (as they may be when reporting their spouse's earnings).
VI. Conclusions
Annual earnings are an essential measure of economic well-being in society; however, our empirical results suggest that gender norms and social-desirability concerns bias survey-reported wage and salary earnings. When married couples violate the norm that husbands out-earn their wives, survey respondents reporting the couples' earnings appear to minimize the violation by inflating the earnings of the secondary-earner husbands and deflating the earnings of the primary-earner wives. This pattern persists when controlling for an array of demographic characteristics and the "true" (administrative) earnings of the spouses. It persists 18 regardless of whether the survey respondent for the couple is the husband or the wife. One lesson from these findings is that survey reports of even seemingly objective, clearly measurable economic outcomes suffer from measurement error due not just to gaps in respondents' knowledge of the outcome but also to gaps between their beliefs or values and the circumstances they are asked to describe.
Our findings show that the impact of gender on survey measurement cannot be reduced to the gender of survey subjects alone. Survey responses about a given survey subject may depend not just on the characteristics of the subject him-or herself but also on the characteristics of other household members and societal and cultural norms. Our results suggest that survey respondents (consciously or unconsciously) compare the earnings of husbands with the earnings of wives and that they report the earnings of both spouses differently when the comparison favors the wife. In this way, the reported earnings of husbands depend on their own earnings relative to the earnings of their wives, and vice versa.
We provide a clear example where a social norm that economists care about directly influences the data that they use to study it. Specifically, we provide evidence that social-desirability bias and gendered norms influence self-reported earnings data when wives earn more. While we do not find large differences on the intensive margin, having a grasp on the role these distortions may play in our general understanding of economic phenomena via their influence on the household-survey data used to produce economic statistics, research, and evaluation is important and should continue to be studied.
This could potentially have profound effects on the methods for conducting empirical studies. As economic researchers, we should be concerned with not only if the variable exists in the data but how the data is reported, by whom, and for what purpose. As our field advances into the 21st century, we should embrace the plethora of big data at our fingertips to help us uncover some of these onceunknown artifacts of the data that we rely on to tell us economic truths about the 19 world we live in. This is just as true for gender economics as it is for other major economic fields. (3). A couple has non-traditional earnings if the wife earns strictly more than the husband in the administrative data. All models control for the husband's and wife's age, race, and educational attainment; cubic functions of the husband's and wife's log-earnings; the couple's log-earnings; the wife's earnings share; the couple's region of residence; its residential status in a metropolitan or non-metropolitan area; the identity of its CPS ASEC household respondent; and the year of its CPS ASEC interview. The sample is dual-earner couples, where each spouse is between 25 and 54 years old, not primarily self-employed, and earns at least 10 percent of the couple's total earnings. Standard errors are clustered by couple. The Disclosure Review Board release number is DRB-B0065-CED-20190710. Note: The table shows estimates of the coefficient from equation (3). A couple has non-traditional earnings if the wife earns strictly more than the husband in the administrative data. All models control for the husband's and wife's age, race, and educational attainment; cubic functions of the husband's and wife's log-earnings; the couple's log-earnings; the wife's earnings share; the couple's region of residence; its residential status in a metropolitan or non-metropolitan area; and the year of its CPS ASEC interview. The sample is dual-earner couples, where each spouse is between 25 and 54 years old, not primarily self-employed, and earns at least 10 percent of the couple's total earnings. 
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